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Conclusion
The effect given to conformance with the obligation to pay in
public sales under the Louisiana jurisprudence is, perhaps,
unique. The French, with the same basic system of sales, have
apparently reached a different result.0 9 The common law, at
least at the present, seems to be more in accord with the French
solution than the Louisiana solution. 70 However, there would
appear to be no innate injustice or violation of public policy in
a consistent and carefully worked out system that would not
permit of a transfer of ownership before all the obligations of
the purchaser have been met. However, the Louisiana jurisprudence does not provide this consistent system. Perhaps the
most undesirable feature of the jurisprudence is not its own inconsistency, but the logical difficulty involved in interpreting
the Civil Code to mean that the purchaser in no respect becomes
owner at adjudication unless he has paid the purchase price,
despite the provisions of articles 2456, 2608, and others which
seem clearly to make the purchaser the owner at the time of
adjudication, at least as between the parties.
Harry R. Sachse

The Trial Court's Duty To Instruct On
Responsive Verdicts
If it be conceded that on a criminal trial, the judge, in instructing the jury as to what verdicts it may find, is limited to
verdicts of the crime charged in the indictment and of such lesser
69. See note 15 supra.
70. 2 WILLISTON, SALES 201-02 (1948), and authority cited therein. "Not only
is the contract complete when the hammer falls, but the property in the goods
passes then, unless some term of the bargain makes it impossible that it should

do so. It is of course possible that such conditions may be imposed by the terms
of the sale as to make immediate transfer of the property in the goods impossible.
The condition that the sale is for cash is, however, not such a condition as will

prevent immediate transfer of the property, since this condition may be satisfied
by construing it as meaning that possession shall not be delivered until payment.
Such a condition is indeed implied in every sale by auction, as well as in other
sales, unless there is agreement for credit.

"Though the contract is complete and the property has passed to the buyer, if
the transaction is within the Statute of Frauds it is unenforceable until a memorandum has been signed by the auctioneer or his clerk who are the agents of both
parties for this purpose. Until then either party still may prevent the bargain
from becoming enforceable by withdrawing from it, and the owner of the property
may revoke the auctioneer's authority prior to that time."
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crimes as may be responsive to the indictment,' the question
then arises as to whether the judge is required to instruct on all
responsive verdicts or whether he may limit the number of ver-

dicts on which he instructs according to the evidence developed
at the trial. An investigation of the cases from many American
jurisdictions indicates that Louisiana's position in this matter
is directly opposite to that of the overwhelming majority of her
sister jurisdictions. An inquiry into the question of the correctness and the desirability of the Louisiana rule is the subject of
this Comment.
The General Rule
The general rule in American jurisdictions is that:there is no
duty on the part of the trial judge to instruct on lesser and included offenses.in the absence of evidence tending to prove such

offenses. 2 Of these jurisdictions, most hold that in the absence
1. LA. R.S. 15:405 ,(1950) : "The verdict must be responsive to the indict'.
f
ment.
2. Anderson v. United States, 170 U.S. 481 (1898); Sparf v. United States,
156 U.S. 51 (1895) ; Goodall v. United States 180 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1950);
Brooks v. State, 248 Ala. 628, 29 So.2d 4 (1947) ; Pierson v. State, 99 Ala. 148,
13 So. 550 (1893) ; State v. Ransom, 62 Ariz. 1, 152 P.2d 621 (1944) ; Antoine
v. State, 49 Ariz. 168, 65 P.2d 646 (1937) ; McGarrah v. State, 217 Ark. 186,
229 S.W.2d 665 (1950) ; Hearn v. State, 212 Ark. 360, 205 S.W.2d 447 (1947) ;
People v. Zilbauer, 44 Cal.2d 43, 279 P.2d 534 (1955) ; People v. Sutic, 41 Cal.2d
483, 261 P.2d 241 (1953) ; McKenna v. People, 124 Colo. 112,235 P.2d 351 (1951) ;
Bantum v. State, 7 Terry 418, 85 A.2d 741 (Del. 1952) ; State v. Carey, 36 Del.
521, 178 At. 877 (1935) ; Henderson v. State, 135 Fla. 548, 185 So. 625 (1938) ;
Key v. State, 211 Ga. 384, 86 S.E.2d 212 (1955) ; Chappell v. State, 209 Ga. 701,
75 S.E.2d 417 (1953) ; State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 253 P.2d 203 (1953) ; State
v. Scott, 72 Idaho 202, 239 P.2d 258 (1951) ; People v. Brown, 415 Ill. 23, 112
N.E.2d 122 (1953) ; People v. Tomaszewski, 406 Ill. 364, 94 N.E.2d 154 (1950) ;
Swain v. State, 214 Ind. 412, 15 N.E.2d 381 (1938) ; State v. Spridgen, 241 Iowa
828, 43 N.W.2d 192 (1950) ; State v. Jones, 233 Iowa 843, 10 N.W.2d 526 (1943) ;
State v. Hocket, 172 Kan. 1, 238 P.2d 539 (1951) ; Brown v. Commonwealth, 275
S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1955); Commonwealth v. Moore, 323 Mass. 70, 80 N.E.2d 24
(1948) ; Commonwealth v. Green, 302 Mass. 547, 20 N.E.2d 417 (1939) ; People
v. Andrus, 331 Mich. 535, 50 N.W.2d 31.0 (1951) ; People v. Treicheil, 229 Mich.
303, 200 N.W. 950 (1924) ; State v. Tennyson, 212 Minn. 158,2 N.W.2d 833
(1942) ; La Fontaine v. State, 78 So.2d 600 (Miss. 1955) ; Duckworth v. State,
209 Miss. 322, 46 So.2d 787 (1950) ; State v. Riggs, 361 Mo. 952, 237 S.W.2d 196
(1951); Wiedman v. State, 141 Neb. 579, 4 N.W.2d 566 (1942) ; State v. Fisko,
58 Nev. 65, 70 P.2d 1113 (1937) ; State v. Monahan, 16 N.J. 83, 106 A.2d 287
(1954) ; State v. Bunk, 4 N.J. 461, 73 A.2d 249 (1950) ; State v. Young, 51 N.M.
77 (1947) ; People v. Lunse, 278 N.Y. 303, 16 N.E.2d 345 (1938) ; People v. Mussenden, 308 N.Y. 558, 127 N.E.2d 551 (1955) ; People v. Stevens, 272 N.Y. 373,
6 N.E.2d 60 (1936) ; State. v. Lamm, 232 N.C. 402, 61 S.E.2d 188 (1950) ; State
v. Dean, 94 Ohio 540, 116 N.E.2d 767 (1953) ; State v. Muskus, 158 Ohio St. 276,
109.N.E.2d 15 (1952) ; Pierce v. State, 96 Okla. Crim. 76, 248 P.2d 633 (1952) ;
Hamilton v. State, 95 Okla. Crim. 262, 244 P.2d 328 (1952) ; State v. Wilson, 182
Ore. 681, 189,P.2d 403 (1948) ; Commonwealth v. Cisneros, 381 Pa. 447, 113 A.2d
293 (1955) ; Commonwealth v. Walker, 178 Pa. Super. 522, 116 A.2d 320 (1955) ;
State v. Prescott, 70 R.I. 403, 40 A.2d 721 (1944) ; State v. Gardner, 219 S.C.
97, 64 S.E.2d 130 (1951) ; Daywood v. State, 157 Tex. Crim. 266, 248 S.W.2d 479
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of evidence of the lesser offense, instructions thereon need not
be given. Others go further and hold such instructions to be
error.3 It has been held that there should be no instructions on a
lesser offense unless the evidence clearly shows that defendant
might be guilty of such offense ;4 but more often courts hold that
if any evidence adduced tends to support a finding of the lesser
crime, no matter how weak such -evidence may be, an instruction
on the lesser crime should be given.5
Rationale
At the outset, it should be understood that when a court states
that "there was no evidence adduced tending to prove the lesser
offense" it may be speaking of one or the other of two possible
situations. One such situation is where the lesser Crime involves
elements not found in the crime charged. For example, the
crimes of murder and manslaughter may both, depending upon
the particular statute, involve an intentional homicide.6 Manslaughter may be defined as an intentional homicide where there
are certain mitigating circumstances, 7 whereas murder is defined
(1952)
Cook v. State, 152 Tex. Crim. 51, 211 S.W.2d 224 (1948); State v.
Mitchell, 3 Utah 2d .70,.278 P.2d 618 (1955) ; Blankenship v. Commonwealth, 193
Va. 587, 70 S.E.2d 335 (1952) ; Taylor v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 587, 43 S.E.2d
906 (1947) ; Brandon v. Webb, 23 Wash.2d 155, 160 P.2d 529 (1945) (application for habeas corpus) ; State v. Allen, 131 W.Va. 667, 49 S.E.2d 847 (1956)
DeVroy v. State, 239 Vis. 466, 1 N.W.2d 875 (1942).
This position is adopted by ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08(5) (Tent. Draft
No. 5, 1956), which states: "The Court shall not charge the jury with respect to
an included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense." Id.
at 30. See also id., comment to § 1.08(5), at 42.
3. People v. Sanchez, 30 Cal.2d 560, 184 P.2d 673 (1943) ; People v. Moore,
386 Ill. 455, 14. N.E.2d 494 (1938); State v., Linville, 148 Kan. 142, 79 P.2d
869 (1938). In one case, the court specified that if the instruction on the lesser
offense was given at the request of the prosecution, it would be reversible error if
there was no evidence of the lesser offense and defendant was convicted of the
lesser offense. People v. Brown, 415 Ill. 23, 112 N.E.2d 122 (1953).
4. State v. Monteith, 53 Idaho 30, 20 P.2d 1023 (1933).
5. People v. Mussenden, 308 N.Y. 558, 127 N.E.2d 551 (1955) ; People v. Cummings, 274 N.Y. 336, 8 N.E.2d 882 (1937) ; Commonwealth v. Walker, 178 Pa.
Super. 522, 116 A.2d 320 (1955) ; State v. Gardner, 219 S.C. 97, 64 S.E.2d 130
(1951). But cf. State v. Gallagher, 4 Wash.2d 437, 103 P.2d 1100 (1940), wherein
the court stated that a defendant could not be convicted of a lesser offense unless
the evidence sustains such a conviction; and De Vroy v. State, 239 Wis. 466, 1
N.W.2d 875 (1942), which states that there must be some reasonable basis in the
evidence, in the judgment of the trial court, to justify an instruction on an offense
lesser than that charged.
6. LA. R.S. 14:29 (1950) states that there are three grades of homicide in
Louisiana: murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide. R.S. 14:30, 14:31, and
14:32 define murder and manslaughter as intentional crimes and negligent homicide as non-intentional.
7. LA. R.S. 14:31 (1950) states, in effect, that manslaughter is a killing where
there is a'specific intent to kill but done in the heat of passion, or a killing where
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as an unmitigated intentional homicide." Plainly, though manslaughter may be considered responsive to a charge of murder,
the crime of manslaughter involves elements, the mitigating circumstances, not found in the crime of murder. Equally as plain
is the fact that the evidence adduced at the trial may tend to
prove the crime of murder without there being any evidence
tending to prove the mitigating circumstances essential to a finding of manslaughter. In such a case the court is clearly correct
in saying that "there was no evidence adduced tending to prove
the lesser offense." However, in the second situation to which
this statement is applied, its use appears to be largely inaccurate.
This situation involves a "lesser and included" offense, that is,
a case in which the greater offense involves all the elements of
the lesser offense plus certain additional elements. A good example is the crime of aggravated assault and simple assault 9
Aggravated assault involves all of the elements of simple assault,
plus the element of aggravation. In this situation, if the court
limits its instructions to the crime of aggravated assault on the
ground that there is no evidence tending to prove the lesser crime
of simple assault, its statement must be held incorrect. If there is
no evidence of simple assault, then it must follow that there is
no evidence of aggravated assault, for the greater crime necessarily involves the lesser. What, then, does the court mean? The
court means that the evidential pattern of the case is such that
"the defendant is guilty either of the crime charged or is guilty
of nothing at all."' 10 The situation thus described is best demonstrated by example, again using the assault crimes. On trial
under a charge of aggravated assault the defendant admits having fired a gun at the victim, thereby "intentional [ly] placing
...another in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery""
by means of "a dangerous weapon.' 1 2 Thus, the aggravating element is admitted and there is no evidence of defendant's having
assaulted the victim in any manner other than by the firing of
there is no "specific" intent to kill, but done in the commission of a minor felony
or a misdemeanor or while resisting arrest.
8. LA. R.S. 14:30 (1950).
9. LA. R.S. 14:36-38 (1950).
10. See, for use of same or similar language, in sustaining a refusal to instruct
on a "lesser and included" offense: Clark v. State, 169 Ark. 717, 276 S.W. 849
(1925) ; State v. Montieth, 53 Idaho 30, 20 P.2d 1033 (1933) ;Duckworth v. State.
209 Miss. 322, 46 So.2d 787 (1950); State v. Bunk, 4 N.J. 461, 73 A.2d 249
(1950).
11. LA. R.S. 14:36 (1950) defining the crime of "assault."
12. LA. R.S. 14:37 (1950) defines "aggravated assault." R.S. 14:38 defines
"simple assault."
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the gun. The sole defense made by the accused is justification or
mistake. Clearly the "defendant is guilty either of the crime
charged or of nothing at all" for the only fact to be found by the
jury is the mens rea, vel non, of the defendant. If the jury rejects
the defense of the accused then, of necessity, it has found that he
is, in fact, guilty of the aggravated offense. If it be conceivable
that the jury might reject the defendant's admission of the use
of a dangerous weapon, then it is without grounds on which to
find a verdict of simple assault, for the use of the dangerous
weapon, the act of aggravation, was the only act of assault of
which there was either allegation or evidence. Therefore, although technically speaking, there is evidence of a simple assault
by reason of the fact that every aggravated assault is considered
to include a simple assault, the evidence does not support a finding of the lesser offense. Under such circumstances most courts
feel justified in refusing to submit the lesser offense to the jury,
which submission could result only in confusion of the jury and
the opportunity for the return of an illogical compromise verdict.
It can be argued that the court ought not have discretion to
refuse to instruct on the lesser offense, since technically there
must be evidence of the lesser offense if there is evidence of the
greater. 13 However, this view appears to be based upon the
notion that the jury, if given the opportunity, might violate its
obligations as a jury. If the evidence satisfies the jury that the
crime charged is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, it ought to
find the accused guilty as charged. It ought to find the converse
if not so satisfied. A finding of the lesser verdict in this situation of necessity involves a finding of the greater, and a finding
that the greater has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt
necessarily involves a finding that the lesser offense is equally
14
not proven.
13. In the case of State v. Muskus, 158 Ohio St. 276, 109 N.E.2d 15 (1952),
the court stated that although a statute permitted conviction of a lesser and included crime, and although the crime there involved was lesser than and included
in the crime charged, the technical inclusion of the lesser in the greater does not
alone justify instruction as to the lesser crime. Whether or not an instruction
should be given on the lesser crime depends upon whether there is evidence to
support the lesser verdict. If not, it is not error to refuse to instruct on the lesser
offense.
14. In People v. Mussenden, 308 N.Y. 558, 127 N.E.2d 551 (1955), the court
stated that if, under any view of the evidence, the defendant may be properly found
guilty of the lesser offense, the court must instruct on the lesser offense, no matter how weak the evidence supporting such instructions may be. But, since under
this rule the jury can ignore the facts and render a compromise verdict, the court
has evolved the rule that submission of the lesser crime is justified only when
there is some basis in the evidence for finding the defendant guilty of the lesser
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It seems error to think that the defendant has been deprived
of some right by the court's refusal to charge on the lesser offense. Since, under the evidence, he "is guilty either of the crime
charged or of nothing at all," it cannot be said that he has a right
to the opportunity for the lesser verdict, which verdict would be
a compromise and irrational. A Delaware court has appropriately stated that "a defendant has no constitutional or statutory
right to a compromise verdict, nor should such verdicts be encouraged."' 15 Nor is the court's action subject to the criticism
that it constitutes a comment on the evidence.' 6 The court has
not usurped a jury function or found an element of "guilt or innocence."' 7 Rather, it has refused to allow the jury to find an
element of guilt which, in the opinion of the court, the jury cannot rationally find. Such a refusal can no more be considered a
comment upon the evidence than can the court's granting a new
trial on the ground that a verdict is "contrary to the law and the
evidence."s
The Louisiana Rule Before 1928
In Louisiana, prior to the adoption of the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure,' 9 there existed two rules on the matter in question. Section 785 of the Revised Statutes of 1870 provided: "There
shall be no crime known under the name of murder in the second
degree; but on trials for murder the jury may find the prisoner
crime and innocent of the greater. But, the court cannot allow the jury to find a
lesser offense when such finding necessarily involves a finding of the greater.
Also, in People v. Sutic, 41 Cal.2d 483, 261 P.2d 241 (1953), it was said that
"jury instructions must be responsive to the issues and are determined by the evidence." The court said that there the defense was non-commission only, and therefore, no issue or evidence raised the question of manslaughter and no evidence
would have supported such a verdict.
15. State v. Carey, 36 Del. 521, 531, 178 Atl. 877, 882 (1935).
16. Cf. Hamilton v. State, 95 Okla. Crim. 262, 244 P.2d 328 (1952), wherein
the court stated that the judge should instruct on the degree of homicide the evidence tends to prove and that it should be determined as a matter of law whether
there is any evidence which would tend to reduce the offense to manslaughter.
Note that, depending upon the particular statute, manslaughter may or may
not be a "lesser and Included" offense of the crime of murder. In Louisiana, it is
not. LA. R.S. 14:29-31 (1950).
17. For a general discussion of the question of the trial court's commenting on
the evidence, see Comment, 16 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 780 (1956).
18. LA. R.S. 15:509(1) (1950). See State v. Daspit, 167 La. 53, 118. So. 690
(1928). Additionally, the fact'that apparently all American jurisdictions (except
Louisiana) and Louisiana until 1928 (as shall appear later) have approved of the
practice of limiting instructions on lesser verdicts to those supported by the evidence, would strongly indicate that such action is not considered to be comment
on the evidence
19. La. Acts 1928, No. 2, p. 4, now LA. R.S. 15:1-582 (1950).
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guilty of manslaughter. ' 20 The Supreme Court consistently held
that this section made it the mandatory duty of the trial judge,
on an indictment for murder, to charge the jury that it might
find the defendant guilty of manslaughter, notwithstanding the
fact that there was no evidence adduced at the trial which would
warrant a finding of manslaughter. 21 The trial judge was required to charge as to the lesser offense whether or not such a
charge had been requested by defendant, 22 and failure or refusal
so to charge was reversible error. 23 In one case 24 the Supreme
Court allowed what might be termed the sole relaxation of this
rule. There, under a murder indictment, the trial judge properly
instructed on the law of manslaughter, but added that if the jury
should find the killing was deliberate and without provocation,
"a verdict of manslaughter would not be responsive to the evidence."25 On rehearing, the Supreme Court approved the lower
court's action, but cautioned that if the lower court had instructed that a verdict of manslaughter would not be responsive
to the "indictment," its instruction would have been erroneous.
The Supreme Court explained its decision by saying that although section 785 gave the jury the "power" to return a verdict
of manslaughter even though it found the killing to have been
deliberate, it did "not mean that jurors" could do so "without
violating: their oath," 26 and to instruct the jury to that effect
was proper.
From the language of section 785 it may be seen that the
effect given that provision is open to certain criticism. On its
face, the statute purports to do little more than to abolish the
crime of second degree murder, replacing it with the crime of
20. LA. REv. STAT. § 785 (1870).
21. State v. Vial, 153 La. 883, 96 So. 796 (1923) ; State v. Parks, 115 La.
765, 40 So. 39 (1905) ; State v. Hicks, 113 La. 779, 37 So. 153 (1905) ; State v.
Thomas, 50 La. Ann. 148, 23 So. 250 (1897) ; State v. Jones, 46 La. Ann. 1395,
16 So. 369 (1894) ; State v. Clark, 46 La. Ann. 704, 15 So. 83 (1894) ; State v.
Brown, 41 La; Ann. 410, 6 So. 670 (i889) ; State v. Brown, 40 La. Ann. 725, 4
So. 897 (1888).
22. State v. Vial, 153 La. 883, 96 So. 796 (1923) ; State v.: Thomas, 50 La.
Ann. 148, 23 So. 250 (1897) ; State v. Jones, 46 La. Ann. 1395, 16 So. 369 (1894)
State v. Brown, 40 La. Ann. 725, 4 So. 897 (1888).
23. State v. Jones, 46 La. Ann. 1395, 16 So. 369 (1894); State v. Brown, 41
La. Ann. 410, 6 So. 670 (1889); State v. Brown, 40 La. Ann. 725, 4 So. 897
(1888).
24. State v. Birbiglia, 149 La. 4, 88 So. 533 (1921).
25. 149 La. 42, 88 So. 546 (1921).
26. Ibid. But of. State v. Brown, 41 La. Ann. 410, 6 So. 670 (1889), wherein
the Supreme Court held to be reversible error the lower court's having followed
its instruction on manslaughter with a statement to the effect that it did not
think that the law of manslaughter could have any application to the case.
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manslaughter. The language referring to the verdict of manslaughter is entirely permissive and it appears somewhat
strained to extract therefrom a mandatory duty to instruct on

manslaughter. Statutes quite similar to section 785 have been
construed by courts of other jurisdictions and no such mandatory duty has been found.2 7 Thus, it would appear that the
Louisiana mandatory duty rule emanates from a rather questionable interpretation of an early statute which referred to a
single crime. As shall appear later in this Comment, this isolated
rule, with the aid of the Legislature and the courts, has come to
occupy the entire field of instructions to juries on lesser offenses.
Prior to 1928, in all cases other than a prosecution under an
indictment for murder, the rule that the judge must, on his own
motion, instruct on lesser and included offenses, did not apply. 28
In such cases the judge was required to instruct on lesser and
included offenses only when such instructions were specially
and timely requested by the defendant,2 9 and then only when
such instructions were supported by the evidence. 30 Where there
was no evidence tending to prove the lesser offense, an instruction as to that offense was "not only unnecessary, but improper." 1 Even in the presence of evidence tending to support
27. Such statutes provide, in effect, that, on an indictment for an offense which
includes lesser offenses, the jury may find the defendant guilty of one of the lesser
offenses. Courts have held that such statutes do not make an instruction on the
lesser offenses mandatory, in absence of evidence of the lesser offenses. Bantum
v. State, 7 Ter. 418, 85 A.2d 741 (Del. 1952) ; State v. Carey, 36 Del. 521, 178
Aft. 877 (1935); State v. Elsen, 68 Idaho 50, 187 P.2d 976 (1947); State v.
Tennyson, 212 Minn. 158, 2 N.W.2d 833 (1942) ; State v. Lamm, 222 N.C. 402,
61 S.E.2d 188 (1950) ; State v. Muskus, 158 Ohio St. 276, 109 N.E.2d 15 (1952) ;
Brandon v. Webb, 23 Wash.2d 155, 160 P.2d 529 (1945) (application for habeas
corpus). These statutes appear to have been recognized as referring specifically
to reaponsiveness only and therefore were not mandatory on the issue of the duty
to instruct.
28. State v. Ramkissoonsingbjiki, 163 La. 750, 112 So. 708 (1927) ; State v.
Braxton, 157 La. 733, 103 So. 24 (1923); State v. Kemp, 120 La. 378, 45 So.
283 (1907) ; State v. O'Connor, 119 La. 464, 44 So. 265 (1907) ; State v. Johnson,
116 La. 30, 40 So. 521 (1906) ; State v. Fruge, 106 La. 694, 31 So. 323 (1901) ;
State v. Wright, 104 La. 44, 28 So. 909 (1900). In State v. Thomas, 50 La. Ann.
148, 23 So. 250 (1897), the court outlined the pre-Code of Criminal Procedure rule
by saying that the rule that the judge must, as a matter of law, instruct on lesser
offenses under a murder indictment was sui generis and did not apply to cases
under an indictment for any other crime.
29. State v. Ramkissoonsinghjiki, 163 La. 750, 112 So. 708 (1927) ; State v.
Braxton, 157 La. 733, 103 So. 24 (1923) ; State v. Wright, 104 La. 44, 28 So.
909 (1900) ; State v. Marqueze, 45 La. Ann. 4, 12 So. 128 (1893).
30. State v. Ramkissoonsinghjiki, 163 La. 750, 112 So. 708 (1927) ; State v.
Braxton, 157 La. 733, 103 So. 24 (1923) ; State v. Kemp, 120 La. 378, 45 So. 283
(1907) ; State v. O'Connor, 119 La. 464, 44 So. 265 (1907) ; State v. Johnson,
116 La. 30, 40 So. 521 (1906) ; State v. Fruge, 106 La. 694, 31 So. 323 (1902).
31. State v. Johnson, 116 La. 30, 35, 40 So. 521, 523 (1906) ; State v. Fruge,
106 La. 694, 700, 31 So. 323, 325 (1902).
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an instruction on the lesser offense, the defendant waived his
right to such instruction by failure to make a timely request
therefor, 32 the Supreme Court restricting its review of the failure to charge under such circumstances to "cases of gross and
33
unambiguous error."
The Louisiana Rule After 1928
The adoption, in 1928, of the Code of Criminal Procedure has,
under the interpretations of the Supreme Court, wrought a substantial change in the duty of trial court judges in respect to instructions on lesser and included offenses. The specific provision
in point was article 38634 which, as originally enacted, read:
"Whenever an indictment sets out an offense including
other offenses of a lesser magnitude or grade, the judge shall
charge the jury the law applicable to all offenses of which the
accused could be found guilty under the indictment and in
all trials for murder the jury shall be instructed that they
may find the accused guilty of manslaughter." (Emphasis
added.) (In 1942 this provision was amended by adding the
words "or negligent homicide" after the word "manslaughter.") 35
In the 1943 case of State v. Stanford 6 the Supreme Court held
that article 386 as amended was an expression of the Legislature's intent that "in all trials for murder it is the mandatory
duty of the judge to instruct the jury that it might find the ac37
cused guilty of either manslaughter or negligent homicide."
Thus, the court was of the opinion that no change had been made
in the pre-1928 rule, as to the homicide crimes. But note that
the new statute, rather than re-enacting the permissive language
of the former section 785, used more mandatory language, in
32. State v. Ramkissoonsinghjiki, 163 La. 750, 112 So. 708 (1927) ; State V.
Braxton, 157 La. 733, 103 So. 24 (1923) ; State v. O'Connor, 119 La. 464, 44 So.
265 (1907) ; State v. Marqueze, 45 La. Ann. 41, 12 So. 128 (1893). The court
explained this rule by saying that defendant is not allowed to take his chances oa
the charge as given and then, after an unfavorable verdict, object to the charge.
State v. Wright, 104 La. 44, 45, 28 So. 909, 910 (1900).
33. State v. Marqueze, 45 La. Ann. 41, 43, 12 So. 128 (1893) ; State v. Curtis,
34 La. Ann. 1213, 1214 (1882). However, the court cautioned that when the evidence permits a verdict other than guilty or not guilty, the trial judge should instruct carefully on all possible verdicts. State v. Wright, 104 La. 44, 46, 28 So. 909,
910 (1900).
34. LA. R.S. 15:386 (1950).
35. La. Acts 1942, No. 147, § 1, p. 500.
36. 204 La. 439, 15 So.2d 817 (1943).
37. 204 La. 446, 15 So.2d 819 (1943).

220

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XVII

conformity with the court's interpretations of the older statute.
As to cases other than those involving an indictment for murder
article 386 was not as specific. It merely stated that "the judge
shall charge the jury the law applicable to all offenses of which
the accused could be found guilty under the indictment." Of
which offenses could the accused be found guilty? It could be
argued: only those of which evidence has been adduced at the
trial. The words "under the indictment" are explainable as
words of limitation, i.e., not only is evidence of the offense required, but also such offense must be an offense lesser than and
included in the offense charged in the indictment. Such a construction, that in the case of a murder indictment it was mandatory that the judge instruct on manslaughter and negligent homicide, and that in all other cases it was permissible and proper for
the judge to limit his instructions on lesser offenses to those of
which evidence had been adduced at the trial, would have been a
recognition that the Legislature had intended to codify the well
established jurisprudential rule existing prior to the adoption
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Otherwise, why would the
statute have made a distinction by providing for the case of a
murder indictment specially and for all other cases generally,
the same distinction made by the pre-1928 jurisprudence? A
reasonable answer in view of the statute's language and history
would appear to be that the Legislature had not intended to make
a change in the law as it existed prior to 1928.
However, the court may have indicated its feeling on this
matter in the 1948 case of State v. Brown s in which, though confronted with a case of a murder indictment, the court made a
blanket statement to the effect that articles 386 (as amended in
1942) and 40639 made it the mandatory duty of the judge to
charge the jury with the law applicable to all of the offenses of
40
which the accused could be found guilty under the indictment.
Significantly, the refused charge had not been as to the law of
manslaughter or negligent homicide, concerning which the statute was specific, but had been as to the law of attempt, of which
38. 214 La. 18, 36 So.2d 624 (1948).
39. LA. R.S. 15:406 (1950) : "When the crime charged includes another of
lesser grade, a verdict of guilty of the lesser crime is responsive to the indictment,
and it is of no moment that the greater offense is a felony and the lesser is a misdemeanor." Note that the statute deals exclusively with the question of responsiveness and that in saying that an offense is responsive does not import a duty to instruct on the lesser offense regardless of the evidence.
40. 214 La. 18, 24, 86 So.2d 624, 627 (1948).
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no mention was made in the statute. The court must have construed the general language of article 386, i.e., "the judge shall
charge the jury with the law applicable to all offenses of which
the accused could be found guilty under the indictment" as meaning that it was the "mandatory duty" of the judge to charge the
jury on the lesser and included crime of attempted murder. Of
necessity, such a holding would preclude any discretion on the
part of the trial judge to limit his instructions on lesser and included offenses to those supported by the evidence.
In 1948, article 386 was again amended 4' to read in part:
"Whenever the indictment sets out an offense including
other offenses of lesser magnitude or grade the judge shall
charge the jury the law applicable to all offenses of which
the accused could be found guilty under the indictment. The
only responsive verdicts which may be rendered, and upon
which the judge shall charge the jury, where the indictment
charges the following offenses are :" (There follows an enumeration of 40 crimes and a specification of the responsive
verdicts allowed to each of the 40 crimes enumerated.) (Emphasis added.)
It should be noticed that the 1948 amendment eliminated the
specific mention of manslaughter as a mandatory charge on an
indictment for murder, but the language that "the judge shall
charge the jury the law applicable to all offenses of which the
accused could be found guilty under the indictment" remained
intact. Insofar as that language is concerned the statute remains
susceptible of an interpretation to the effect that "the accused
could be found guilty" only of offenses of which there is evidence. However, the second sentence, added by the 1948 amendment, is considerably more mandatory in tone and would appear
to preclude any other construction, unless the court should hold
"shall" to be used as permissive rather than mandatory. That
the court is not inclined to do so was indicated in the 1950 case
of State v. Broussard,42 where, in discussing the question of the
responsiveness of a verdict of simple rape to an indictment for
aggravated rape, the court stated that it was specifically declared
so to be by article 386, "under which the judge was required, on
a charge of attempted aggravated rape, to instruct the jury that
it had the right to find appellant guilty of an attempt to commit
41. La. Acts 1948, No. 161, § 1, p. 453.
42. 217 La. 90, 46 So.2d 48 (1950).
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simple rape. ' 43 The Stanford case was cited in support and the
judge's duty to instruct on the lesser offense
court described the
44

as "mandatory.

Recent Cases
Thus, from the language of the present article 386 and the
cases above discussed, it would appear that the rule, which began
with a doubtful interpretation of section 785 of the Revised Statutes of 1870 as to a single crime, has, by successive stages of enactment and decision, enveloped the entire subject of the duty to
instruct on lesser crimes. However, it may yet be argued that
the mandatory duty rule is not the law of Louisiana. Such an
argument would be based upon four propositions: (1) that the
present language of article 386 does not preclude absolutely an
interpretation to the effect that "the judge shall charge the jury
the law applicable to all offenses of which the accused could be
found guilty under the indictment" and the evidence; (2) that
there is yet no case which has directly decided that the mandatory duty rule is the law of Louisiana; (3) that recent cases have
shown that the question may still be open; and (4) that of the
two rules, the mandatory duty rule is the less desirable.
As to the first proposition, the possible interpretations of
article 386 have already been discussed. As for the jurisprudence
discussed thus far, none of the cases appear to have squarely held
the mandatory duty rule to be the law. The cases of State v.
Stanford4 5 and State v. Love,4 holding that article 386, as it stood
before the 1948 amendment, made it the mandatory duty of the
judge under a murder indictment to instruct on manslaughter
and negligent homicide, were grounded upon specific language
of the statute which has since been deleted. In the case of State
v. Brown,47 the issue presented was whether or not the verdicts

of attempted murder and attempted manslaughter were responsive to the charge of murder, and the statement to the effect
that instructions as to these offenses were mandatory was
43. Id. at 102, 46 So.2d at 52.
44. Ibid., 46 So.2d at 53.
45. 204 La. 439, 15 So.2d 817 (1943).
46. 210 La. 11, 26 So.2d 156 (1946). See also State v. Ferrand, 210 La. 394,
27 So.2d 174 (1946), where the court stated that article 386 obliges the trial court,
on a trial for aggravated rape, to instruct on the offense of attempted aggravated
rape. But there the statement was made in assigning reasons for its holding on a
question of the admission of evidence of prior criminal acts of the accused. The
court was not presented with the question of the trial judge's duty to instruct.
47. 214 La. 18, 36 So.2d 624 (1948).
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dictum. State v. Broussard48 was identical. The issue was responsiveness and the statement as to the court's duty to instruct
was dictum.
Concerning proposition number three, two recent cases indicate that the state of the law is not presently certain. In the case
of State v. Espinosa,49 decided in 1953, the defendant was
charged with having "unlawfully obtained a narcotic drug," and
the defendant had reserved an exception to the lower court's refusal to instruct the jury that it could bring in an attempt verdict. The Supreme Court, after determining that a verdict of
attempt was responsive to a charge of "obtaining," said, "be that
as it may, the defendant was charged with obtaining a narcotic,
and his confession which was admitted in evidence states that
he did obtain the drug through forgery." "The judge's ruling in
refusing this charge (of attempt) was correct."5 That is, granting that such a verdict would be responsive, there was no duty
to instruct on the lesser offense in the absence of evidence tending to reduce the crime to an attempt. Thus, the court would
appear to have rejected the mandatory duty rule. However, it
may be significant that the court did not mention article 386 in
the opinion. The most recent case on the question, State v.
Marshfield,5 1 was decided in 1956, and presented a situation almost identical to that found in State v. Espinosa, but with opposite results. There, the defendant, on trial under a charge of
"possession of narcotics," made a timely request for a special
charge on the law of attempt. The trial judge refused to give
the requested charge, stating in his per curiam that the refusal
was "for the reason that there was no evidence adduced as to
any attempt to commit the crime, ' . 2 citing the Espinosa case in
support of his ruling. The Supreme Court held the lower court's
ruling to be error, but in doing so, it appeared to concern itself
solely with the question of whether the crime of attempted possession was responsive to the crime charged. It made no men48. 217 La. 90, 46 So.2d 48 (1950).
49. 223 La. 520, 66 So.2d 323 (1953).
50. Id. at 526, 66 So.2d at 325.
51. 229 La. 55, 85 So.2d 28 (1956).
52. See trial court's per curiam, 229 La. 56, 85 So.2d 28, 29 (1956). Notice
here that the lesser crime in question, attempt, is a "lesser and included crime"
and therefore falls into that class of cases discussed earlier in the comment as
"situation two." Therefore, the lower court's statement is not technically correct,
for if there was evidence of the greater crime there must also have been evidence
of the lesser crime. What the lower court appears to have meant was that under
the evidence the defendant was guilty of the crime charged or of nothing at all.
Hence, a charge on the lesser offense would have been of no purpose.
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tion of the evidence issue raised by the lower court's per curiam.
The higher court merely cited article 386 without comment."
The lower court's citation of the Espinosa case, which appears
clearly to support the ruling below, was disposed of by saying
that the Supreme Court had explained the Espinosa decision in
the case of State v. Nicolosi,5 4 which decision had not been handed

down as of the time of the trial of the Mansfield case. However,
an examination of the opinion in the Nicolosi case shows that
there the sole question presented and discussed was whether or
not a verdict of attempt was responsive to a charge of "possession." The court correctly held that the ruling in the Espinosa
case did not overrule the prior decisions to the effect that attempt was responsive to a charge of possession and that the holding in the Espinosa case was "clearly inapposite." 55 It seems
clear that the issue presented in the Espinosa and Marshfield
cases was neither presented nor passed upon in the Nicolosi case.
It is difficult to understand how the Nicolosi case "explained"
the Espinosacase for purposes of the Marshfield decision. State
v. Espinosa and State v. Marshfield appear to have reached opposite conclusions upon the same question. 6
In view of the almost universal rejection of the "mandatory
duty" rule in other jurisdictions,

7

it is suggested that the rule

53. Id. at 60, 85 So.2d at 30. It seems possible that the court failed to distinguish between the issues of responsiveness to the indictment and responsiveness
to the evidence. That such issues are distinct is well demonstrated by the cases
cited in note 2 8upra, all of which dealt with the issue of whether instructions
must be given on an offense, admittedly responsive to the indictment, which may
or may not be responsive to the evidence. As shown above, the pre-1928 Louisiana
cases also recognized the distinction. The confusion of the two issues in Louisiana
began with the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure and this obscuration may be at
the heart of the present difficulties.
54. 228 La. 65, 81 So.2d 771 (1955).
55. Id. at 78, 81 So.2d at 775. The court stated that the "principal basis" for
the holding in the Espinosa case was that the defendant had confessed to the crime
charged, implying that since the evidence established commission, the lower court
correctly refused to instruct on attempt to commit. Further, the court clearly
recognized that the issue in the Nicolosi case was responsiveness, and therefore
the Espinosa case, which dealt with the duty to instruct, "was clearly inapposite."
56. Perhaps the strongest criticism which can be made of the Espinosa case
would be based upon article 557 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, i.e., the "harmless error rule," which provides in substance that error shall not be ground for reversal unless the error results in substantial prejudice to the defendant. In the
instant case, there having been a conviction of the substantive crime of "possession," it is difficult to see how the defendant was prejudiced by a refusal of the
trial judge to instruct the jury that it could find defendant guilty of attempt. Presumably, he was guilty of "possession" for the jury found him so. The remand of
the case should result only in finding him guilty once again, but this time, with
the right given to the jury to find him guilty of a crime which would be illogical
in view of the evidence.
57. See cases cited note 2 supra.
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which apparently obtains in Louisiana should be reconsidered. It
is also suggested that, if it be found that the present language of
article 386 can be construed to be permissive, and that the jurisprudence presents but one case, the Espinosa case, in which the
issue was both presented and passed upon, and that in that case
the mandatory duty rule was rejected, the court might make this
reconsideration without legislative ihtervention. However, if
necessary, legislative correction could be made simply by amending article 386 to read: "The judge shall charge the jury the law
applicable to all offenses of which the accused could be found
guilty under the indictment and the evidence. The only responsive verdicts which may be rendered, and upon which the
judge may charge the jury, . . . are: ...."
The "mandatory duty" rule may stem from an idea expressed
on several occasions by the Supreme Court that if a defendant
is convicted of a crime lesser than that charged he has no complaint on that account because the result was to his advantage., 8
However, it does not follow that being convicted of a crime of
which there was no proof on the one hand, or under an illogical
verdict on the other, is to the advantage of the defendant in every
case. Juries should be required to return verdicts of which they
find proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The "mandatory duty"
rule encourages compromise verdicts. It would appear that the
better rule would be to allow the trial judge to limit his instructions on lesser and included offenses to those a verdict of which
would be reasonably supported by the evidence.
Daniel J. Shea
58. State v. Malmay, 209 La. 476, 24 So.2d 869 (1946). Other courts have
held that an instruction on a lesser offense in the absence of evidence of such
lesser offense, though error, is not prejudicial, for such error is to the defendant's
advantage. Smith v. State, 222 Ark. 650, 262 S.W.2d 272 (1953) ; People v.
Andrus, 331 Mich. 535, 50 N.W.2d 310 (1951) ; People v. Miller, 96 Mich. 119,
55 N.W. 675 (1893) ; Hamilton v. State, 95 Okla. Crim. 262, 244 P.2d 328 (1952).
But see Duckworth v. State, 209 Miss. 322, 46 So.2d 787 (1950), where the court
admonishes that to instruct on the lesser offense under these circumstances is to
invite the compromise verdict; and State v. Carey, 36 Del. 521, 178 Atl. 877
(1935), wherein the court states that "a defendant has no . . . right to a compromise verdict." See also State v. Scott, 72 Idaho 202, 239 P.2d 258 (1951),
where the court held that the failure to instruct on a lesser offense is favorable to
the defendant, for it is not presumed that the jury will convict of the higher offense because it was not allowed to convict of the lesser offense. It is presumed
that there will not be a conviction of the higher offense without proof thereof
beyond a reasonable doubt.

